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We  introduce  a  new  solution  for  Nash’s  bargaining  problem,  called  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solu- 
tion.  This  solution  is  a  lexicographic  extension  of  the  equal-loss  solution,  which  equalizes  across  agents 
the  losses  from  the  ideal  point,  to  satisfy  Pareto  optimality.  An  axiomatic  characterization  is  presented 
by  using  the  following  five  axioms:  Pareto  optimality,  anonymity,  translation  invariance,  weak 
monotonicity,  and  independence  of  alternatives  other  than  the  ideal  point. 
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1.  Introduction 
Suppose  a  bundle  of  goods  is  to  be  divided  or  redivided  between  a  number  of 
agents.  Among  the  many  criteria  according  to  which  such  a  division  might  be 
chosen,  consider  the  following  pair  of  more  or  less  complementary  criteria:  either 
the  utility  gains  of  agents  relative  to  their  utility  levels  of  initial  holdings  are  impor- 
tant,  or  their  utility  losses  with  respect  to  their  maximally  attainable  utilities. 
One  appropriate  framework  for  studying  problems  like  the  division  problem 
above,  is axiomatic  bargaining  theory,  which  started  with  the  seminal  paper  by  Nash 
(1950).’  Solutions  can  be  judged  according  to  the  gains  or  losses  criteria.  Typical 
examples  of  solutions  for  which  the  gains  criterion  is central,  are  the  egalitarian  and 
lexicographic  egalitarian  solutions  (for  formal  definitions  of  these  solutions,  see  the 
next section);  for  which  either  the  gains  or  the  losses  criterion  can  be  relevant-the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky  (1975)  solution. 
In  this  paper  we  propose  and  axiomatically  characterize  a  solution  for  which  the 
losses  criterion  is taken  as  a lead:  the  so-called  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution.  Ac- 
’  See  Thomson  (forthcoming)  for  an  extensive  review  of  the  literature  on  axiomatic  bargaining 
theory. 
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cording  to  this  solution,  an  outcome  in  a  bargaining  problem  is  determined  as 
follows.  First,  one  takes  the  maximal  feasible  outcome  in  which  the  players  suffer 
equal  losses  from  their  utility  levels  at  the  ideal  point  (each  coordinate  of  which  is 
the  maximally  attainable  utility  level  of  an  agent  guaranteeing  to  the  others  their  in- 
itial  utility  levels).  If  this  outcome  is  not  (strongly)  Pareto  optimal,  then  a  lex- 
icographic  procedure  is  used  to  arrive  at  a  Pareto  optimal  outcome.  So  the  ideal 
point  plays  a  central  role;  the  disagreement  point  (e.g.  the  point  representing  the 
utility  levels  of  initial  holdings  in  a division  problem)  only  matters  insofar  as it deter- 
mines  the  ideal  point.  The  same  idea  is  embodied  in  two  of  the  axioms  used  to 
characterize  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution,  namely  weak  monotonicity  and 
independence  of alternatives  other  than  the idealpoint.  The  remaining  three  axioms 
in  our  characterization  are  Pareto  optimality,  anonymity,  and  translation  in- 
variance. 
The  axioms  also  show  that  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution  offers  a  com- 
promise  between  monotonicity  and  Pareto  optimality.  Recall  that  Lute  and  Raiffa 
(1957)  have  already  shown  that  (strong)  monotonicity  is inconsistent  with  Pareto  op- 
timality. 
The  next  section  discusses  definitions  and  axioms,  and  Section  3  contains  the 
characterization  result  and  its  proof.  Section  4  concludes. 
2.  Preliminaries 
An  n-person  bargaining  problem,  or  simply  a problem,  is  a  pair  (S, d),  where  S 
is  a  subset  of  R”  and  d  is  a  point  in  S,  such  that 
(1)  S  is  convex  and  closed, 
(2)  ai(S,d)~max{x;I~~(xl,...,x,)ES,x~d}~  exists  for  all  i, 
(3)  S  is  comprehensive,  i.e.  for  all  x E S  and  for  all  y E R”,  if  y 5 x,  then  y E S, 
(4)  there  exists  XES  with  x>d. 
We  denote  by  Z  the  class  of  all  n-person  problems.  We  interpret  a  problem 
(S, d) E Z  as  follows:  the  n agents  can  achieve  any  point  of  the  feasible  set S if  they 
unanimously  agree  on  it;  otherwise,  they  end  up  at  the  disagreement  point  d.  Points 
of  S  are  called  feasible  outcomes.  The  coordinates  of  an  XES  may  be  the  utility 
levels  attained  by  the  n agents  through  the  choice  of  some  joint  action.  Closedness 
of  S  is  required  for  mathematical  convenience;  convexity  stems  from  allowing  lot- 
teries  in  an  underlying  bargaining  situation.  Property  (2)  is  a  boundedness  condi- 
tion,  and  comprehensiveness  may  be justified  by  the  assumption  of  free  disposability 
of  utility.  Condition  (4)  is a nondegenerateness  requirement,  and  may  be  interpreted 
as  providing  the  agents  .with  an  incentive  to  reach  some  agreement. 
A  solution  is  a  function  F: .L+  R”  such  that  for  all  (S, d) E Z,  F(S, d) ES. 
F(S,d),  the  value  taken  by  the  solution  F  when  applied  to  the  problem  (S,d),  is 
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called  the  solution  outcome  of  (S, d).  Nash  (1950)  proposed  to  handle  bargaining 
problems  by  looking  for  solutions  satisfying  appealing  axioms,  and  we  will  adopt 
his  approach  here. 
In  what  follows,  we  will  be  interested  in  the  following  axioms.  First,  we  introduce 
some  notation.  For  (S,d)eZ’,  let  PO(S)=  {xES~  for  all  X’E R”,  x’>x  implies 
x’$  S)  be  the  set  of  Pareto  optimal  points  of  S.  Similarly,  let  WPO(S)  =  {x E Sl  for 
all  X’E R”,  x’>x  implies  x’$S}  be  the  set  of  weakly  Pareto  optimal  points  of  S. 
Pareto  optimality  (PO).  For  all  (S, d)  E Z,  F(S,  d)  E PO(S). 
LetN={l,...,  n>  denote  the  set  of  agents,  and  let  TC  : N+  N  be  a permutation  of  N. 
For  x=(x  ,,...,  x,)ER”,  let  r=(Q),  . . ..X.(,,,),  and  for  ScR”,  let 
7&{rcXIXES~. 
Anonymity  (AN).  For  all  (S,d)  EZ  and  all  permutations  rz  of  N,F(rtS,  red) = 
TtF(S, d). 
Given  SCR”  and  tER”,  let  S+t={x+tlxeS}. 
Translation  invariance  (TINV).  For  all  (S, d)  E 2  and  for  all  t E R”,  F(S  + t, d + t) = 
F(S, d) + t. 
PO  requires  that  the  solution  outcome  should  exhaust  all  gains  from  cooperation. 
AN  requires  that  the  names  of  the  agents  do  not  affect  the  solution  outcome.  TINV 
requires  that  the  choice  of  zeros  for  utility  functions  does  not  matter  in  the  deter- 
mination  of  the  solution  outcome. 
The  following  two  axioms  are  less  well  known,  but  have  been  discussed  before 
in  the  literature.  For  XE R”  and  i E N,  let  x-,  be  the  (n -  I)-dimensional  vector  ob- 
tained  after  deleting  the  ith  component  of  x.  Also,  for  (S,d)  EZ,  let  Sd,-;=  the 
closure  of  {xpi  1  x~S,xsa(S,d)}. 
Weak  monotonicity  (WMON).  For  all  (S, d),  (S’, d’)  EZ,  if  S c  S’,  d=  d’  and 
S&j’s;,,_;  for  all  i,  then  F(S’,  d’)  zF(S,  d). 
Independence  of  alternatives  other  than  the  ideal  point  (IAIP).  For  all  (S,d), 
(S’, d’)  ~2,  if  S 1 S’,  a(S,  d)  = a(S’,  d’)  and  F(S,  d)  E S’,  then  F(S’,  d’)  =F(S,  d). 
WMON,  introduced  for  two-person  problems  by  Kalai  and  Smorodinsky  (1975),  re- 
quires  that  an  expansion  of  the  feasible  set  which  does  not  affect  the  ideal  point 
should  not  hurt  any  agent.  However,  a straightforward  extension  of  this  axiom  may 
be  incompatible  with  Pareto  optimality  for  more  than  two-person  bargaining  pro- 
blems,  as  shown  by  Roth  (1979).  Our  version  of  the  axiom,  introduced  by  Imai 
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timality.  IAIP  introduced  by  Roth  (1977),  requires  that  if  the  feasible  set  contracts 
and  the  disagreement  point  changes  without  affecting  the  ideal  point,  and  the  solu- 
tion  outcome  for  the  original  problem  is  still  feasible  for  the  smaller  problem,  then 
the  solution  outcome  for  the  smaller  problem  should  be  the  same  as  that  for  the 
original  problem.  This  requirement  could  be  regarded  as  ‘dual’  to  Nash’s  (1950)  in- 
dependence  of irrelevant  alternatives,  which  requires  that  if  the  feasible  set  contracts 
without  affecting  the  disagreement  point,  and  the  solution  outcome  for  the  original 
problem  is  still  feasible  for  the  smaller  problem,  then  the  solution  outcome  for  the 
smaller  problem  should  be  the  same  as  that  for  the  original  problem. 
Now  we  introduce  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution.  For  this  definition,  and 
in  what  follows,  we  need  an  additional  notation.  For  0fMc  N,  we  denote  by  eM 
the  n-dimensional  vector  with  ith  coordinate  1 if  ieA4  and  0  otherwise. 
Definition.  Let  >’ denote  the  lexicographic  ordering  on  R”,  i.e.  x  >‘y  (x, y E R”)  if 
there  is  an  ie  N  with  Xi>Y;  and  Xj=uj  for  all  j<  i.  Let  (Y: R” + R”  be  such  that  for 
each  x E R” there  is  a  permutation  n  of  N  with  a(x)  = X(X) and  at(x)  5  CQ(X)  5  ...s 
a,,(x).  Then  the  lexicographic  maximin  ordering  >Im on  R”  is  defined  by  x>lm 
y(x, y E R”)  if  a(x)  >‘a( y).  The  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution  L * :  C+  R” assigns 
to  each  problem  (S, d) E .Z the  unique  point  of  S  in  the  following  way: 
(1)  let  t=a(S,d)  and  S*=S-t, 
(2)  find  a  maximal  element  x*  of  S*  with  respect  to  >Im, 
(3)  L*(S,d)=x*+  t. 
(The  equal-loss  solution  E * : .Z  +  R” assigns  to  each  problem  (S, d) E Z  the  maximal 
point  x  of  S  such  that  a;(& d) -x;  =  aj  (S,  d) -  Xj for  all  i,j  E N.) 
It  can  be  shown  that  L * is well  defined,  in  much  the  same  way  as  this  is done  for 
the  so-called  lexicographic  egalitarian  solution.3  L*  can  be  regarded  as  ‘dual’  to 
this  solution,  just  as  E*  corresponds  to  the  well-known  egalitarian  solution.  The 
egalitarian  solution  and  its  lexicographic  version  have  been  studied  extensively, 
whereas  the  equal-loss  solution  has  been  characterized  very  recently  by  Chun 
(1988).4  For  two-person  bargaining  problems,  E*  satisfies  Pareto  optimality  and 
consequently  coincides  with  its  lexicographic  version.  However,  for  more  than  two- 
person  bargaining  problems,  E* suffers  the  following  two  limitations:  it satisfies  only 
weak  Pareto  optimality  and,  as  pointed  out  by  Thomson  (forthcoming),  it  does  not 
satisfy  individual  rationality.5  Here  we  propose  its  lexicographic  version,  which  satis- 
fies  Pareto  optimality  for  all  bargaining  problems.  Also  we  will  discuss,  in  the  con- 
3 If  we  set  t =d  in  the  above  definition,  then  the  resulting  solution  is the  lexicographic  egalitarian  solu- 
tion.  The  egalitarian  solution  E : Z + R”  assigns  to  each  problem  (S, d)  E Z  the  maximal  point  x of  S such 
that  x,-d,  =x,  -  dJ for  all  i, j  E N.  The  egalitarian  solution  has  been  characterized  by  Kalai  (1977).  and 
its  lexicographic  version  by  Lensberg  (1982),  Chun  (1989),  and  Chun  and  Peters  (1988,  1989). 
4 E*  is  a  variant  of  the  family  of  solutions  proposed  by  Yu  (1973).  Actually,  Yu’s  ‘solution’  is  not  a 
solution  in  our  sense  since  it  may  result  in  multiple  solution  outcomes. 
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eluding  section,  how  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution  can  be  modified  to  satisfy 
both  Pareto  optimality  and  individual  rationality. 
There  is  an  interesting  procedure  to  find  L*(S,d)  ((S,d)  ~25).  First,  decrease  the 
utilities  of  the  n  agents  in  N’=N  equally  from  a(S,d),  along  a(S,  d)-  <ie,,,i 
(C’zO),  until  a  boundary  point  is  reached,  say  z’.  If  z’  EPO(S),  then  set  z=z’. 
Otherwise,  let  N2  C  N  be  the  largest  possible  subset  of  agents  whose  utilities  can  be 
equally  increased  in  a  non-negative  direction  starting  from  z’,  i.e.  go  along  the 
direction  z’ + c2eN*  (c2>O).  Let  z2  be  the  maximal  point  in  this  direction  and  still 
in  S;  if  z2ePO(S),  then  z=z2,  otherwise  we  continue  along  the  direction  zz+ 
[‘eNi  (c3 >O),  where  N3cN2  is  the  largest  possible  subset  of  agents  for  which  an 
increase  along  z2 + c3e,,,x is  still  possible,  etc.  In  this  way  we  end  up,  after  a  finite 
number  of  steps,  at  a  point  z E PO(S).  It  is  not  hard  to  show  that  z = L *(S, d);  one 
may  adapt  Lemma  3 in  Imai  (1983)  to  our  context.  This  procedure  to  find  L*(S, d) 
illustrates  our  expression  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution.  The  equal-loss  solution 
assigns  to  each  problem  (S, d) EC  the  point  z’  above. 
3.  Main  result 
In  this  section  we  show  that  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution,  L*,  is the  uni- 
que  solution  satisfying  the  five  axioms  introduced  above.6 
Theorem.  The lexicographic  equal-loss  solution  L * is the unique  solution  satisfying 
Pareto  optirnality,  anonymity,  translation  invariance,  weak  monotonicity,  and  in- 
dependence  of  alternatives  other  than  the  ideal point. 
It  is  straightforward  to  verify  that  L * satisfies  PO,  AN,  and  TINV.  The  fact  that 
it  satisfies  IAIP  and  WMON  is  proved  in  the  following  lemmas. 
Lemma  1.  The  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution  satisfies  independence  of  alter- 
natives  other  than  the  ideal point. 
Proof.  Let  (S,d),  (S’,d’)~z  be  two  problems  satisfying  the  hypotheses  of  IAIP. 
Also,  let  {z’]  CS  be  the  sequence  as  defined  in  the  process  of  finding  L*(S, d)=zr. 
Since  zr~  S’,  z’ szr  for  all  t,  and  S’ is comprehensive,  we  have  z’ E S’ for  all  t. Now 
we  construct  the  sequence  {?)cS  to  find  L*(S’,d’).  Since  S’CS,  a(S’,d’)= 
a(S, d),  and  z’ E S’ for  all  t, Z’ =zt  for  all  t.  Therefore,  we  conclude  that  L *(S’,  d’) = 
zT= L*(S,d).  0 
’  Although  we  characterize  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution,  whereas  Imai  (1983)  characterizes 
the  lexicographic  version  of  the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  (1975)  solution,  some  parts  of  our  proofs  are  similar 
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Lemma  2.  The  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution  satisfies  weak  monotonicity. 
_- 
Proof.  Let  (S, d),  (S, d)  EZ  be  such  that  S G s,  d = a  and  S,  _i = &, _i for  all  i. Note 
that  S,  _i = sd, _;  for  all  i implies  that  a(S, d) = a($  d).  Since  L * satisfies  TINV,  we 
may  assume  that  a(S,d)  =eN.  The  proof  is  done  by  the  help  of  two  claims,  which 
require  the  following  additional  notation.  For  y E S,  let  N(S,  y)  G N  be  defined  by 
N(S,  y) =  {i EN  1  y + [ec il E S for  some  [ > 0}  .  N(S,  y)  denotes  the  largest  subset  of 
players  of  N,  whose  utilities  could  be  increased  equally  from  y  in  S.  Let  [*  be  the 
minimal  number  such  that  for  all  [>[*,  y + ce N(s,y) $ S.  Finally,  let  z(S, y) = 
y + 5 *eN(S,  v). 
Claim  1.  For  all  y E S,  if  N(S,  y) #PI,  then  N(S,  y) = N($  y). 
Proof.  Since  S c  s,  it  is  clear  that  N(S,  y) c N(S,  y).  We  will  show  that  N($  y) c 
N(S,  y).  Suppose,  by  way  of  contradiction,  that  there  exists j E N(S,  y)\  N(S,  y).  Let 
z=z(S,y)  and  ~=z($y).  Clearly,  ~52.  NOW pick  kEN(S,y).  Since  Sd,+=&;  for 
all  i,  there  exists  XE S  such  that  xpk=zpk.  By  the  convexity  of  S,  for  all  1 E [O, I], 
2x+(1-l)z=x’ES.  Since  x_k=zk~y_k,  z-k,y_k  and  zk>yk,  there  exists 
2 E (0, l]  such  that  xi  2~.  Since  ~j>y,  = z,,  x;“>yj.  Altogether,  we  obtain  X; >yj, 
x’zy  and  XE S,  which  implies  that  jeN(S,y),  a  contradiction. 
Claim  2.  Let  T>  1 be  the  final  step  in  finding  L*(S,d).  Also,  let  {z’]  and  {Z’}  be 
the  two  sequences  as  defined  in  the  process  of  finding  L *(S, d)  and  L *(S, d)  respec- 
tively.  Then,  for  all  t = 1,. . . , T-  1,  zf = z’. 
Proof.  First,  we  will  consider  the  case  when  t = 1.  Since  S c  s  and  a(S, d) = a($  d), 
it  is  clear  that  z1 5~‘.  We  need  to  show  that  Z’ 5~‘.  Suppose,  by  way  of  contradic- 
tion,  that  there  exists  j  E N  such  that  Zj >z,!.  Since  Z’  and  z’  are  points  with  equal 
coordinates,  it  follows  that  Z’ >z’.  Since  T is  the  final  step,  z’  E WPO(S)\PO(S). 
Therefore,  there  exists  XES  such  that  XLZ’.  Let  keN  be  such  that  xk>z:.  On  the 
other  hand,  since  S,  ~1  = s,  _; for  all  i, there  exists  y E S such  that  y-k  = z!k.  By  the 
convexity  of  S,  for  all  Ae[O,l],  Ax+(l-A)y=yy”~S.  Since  x22’,  xk>zL  and 
y-k  = s!,  > z!,  ,  there  exists  A E (0,l)  such  that  y” >zl.  This  is  a  contradiction  to 
z’ E WPO(S). 
The  proofs  for  t = 2, . . . , T-  1 are  analogous,  using  Claim  1, and  thus  are  omitted. 
Finally,  by  combining  the  results  of  Claims  1  and  2,  it  follows  that  zT= 
L *(S, d)  ~$2  L*(s,  d).  Therefore,  L * satisfies  WMON.  0 
For  the  proof  of  the  theorem,  we  need  some  additional  notation.  Given 
(S, d) ~2,  Int(S)  is  the  interior  of  S.  And  given  PER”  and  ZE R”,  H(p,pz)= 
{x E R” 1  pxspz}.  Here,  juxtaposition  of  vectors  denotes  inner  product. 
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mathematics.  The  proof  uses  the  procedure  for  finding  L *(S, d)  ((S, d)  E 2’) described 
at  the  end  of  Section  2.  Note  that  we  need  to  figure  out  z’,  . . . ,zT  to  obtain 
L*(S,d)  = zT.  First,  by  translation  invariance,  we  may  assume  that  the  ideal  point 
has  all  coordinates  equal.  The  main  step  of  the  proof  lies  in  the  construction  of  se- 
quences  of  problems,  whose  solution  outcome  is  z’ (t =  1, . . . , T).  The  first  problem 
of  the  sequence  is  symmetric,  whence  its  solution  outcome  is  determined  to  be  z’ 
by  Pareto  optimality  and  anonymity.  In  the  induction  argument,  using  weak 
monotonicity  and  independence  of  alternatives  other  than  the  ideal  point,  we  obtain 
that  the  solution  outcome  for  step  t (t = 2, . . . , T)  should  be  greater  than  or  equal  to 
the  solution  outcome  for  step  I -  1,  z’-‘.  By  Pareto  optimality,  we  can  conclude 
that  it  is  equal  to  z’. 
_- 
Proof  of  theorem.  Let  F  be  a solution  satisfying  the  five  axioms.  Also,  let  (S, d)  E _Z  -- 
be  given.  By  TINV,  we  may  assume  that  a(S,d)  =eN.  Let  S=  {xe  s  1  x~a(S,d)} 
and  d’~Int(S)  be  such  that  d,‘=d,f=l-6  for  all  i,j~N  and  a(S,d’)=e,. 
Equivalently,  we  may  take,  by  TINV,  d = 0 and  a(S,  d)  = 6e,.  Note  that  6 > 0.  Now 
let  {z’}p=,  and  {N’}T=,  be  the  sequences  as  defined  in  the  process  of  finding 
L *(S, d).  We  will  show  that  F(S,  d)  = z7.  Then,  by  IAIP  we  have  F(S,  d)  = zT,  and 
--  -- 
by  WMON,  we  have  F(S,  d)  =zT=  L*(S,  d),  which  then  concludes  the  proof. 
Now  we  construct  auxiliary  problems.  Let  M’=N\N’  and  p’=eeM,  for 
f=  I,...,  T  (where  M’  = 0  and  p’  = 0).  Define 
S’,‘=H(e,,  C  zf) n  h  H(p”,pkzk) 
( k=l  1 
fl  (de,-R,“),  for  t=  1, . . . . T, 
S2,r,S’,tr)H(p’+‘,p’+tzf+‘),  for  t=l,...,T-1, 
S3,‘=H(e,,  C  z;)ns,  for  t=  1, . . . . T,  and 
S4”=Si3’nS  >  for  t=  1  , ...,  T. 
Claim  1.  z’ E SC’ and  dE  Int(S’.‘)  for  all  r  and  t. 
Proof.  By  definition  of  p’,  p’~‘=p’z”~  for  all  t = 1, . . . , T and  for  all  s =  1, . . . , T-  t. 
Also,  note  that  by  definition  of  the  sequence  {z’},  $5  zr+’  for  all  t = 1, . . . , T-  1. 
Now  it  follows  immediately  that  Z/ES”’  for  all  r and  t.  Since  d<z’  and  S  is  com- 
prehensive,  dE  Int(S’.‘)  for  all  r  and  t.  This  proves  the  claim. 
Claim  2.  a(,~~‘,  d)  = de,  for  all  r  and  1. 
Proof.  For  all  i E N,  let  y’  be  such  that  y: = 6  and  J$ = 0  for  all  j#  i.  Since 
a(S,  d)  = de,  and  S  is  comprehensive,  yie  S  for  all  i.  It  is  enough  to  show  that  all 
y”s  belong  to  the  half-spaces  defined  above.  For  t = 1,  ply’=0  and  trivially  y’~ 
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Before  we  consider  the  case  when  t >  1,  we  first  need  to  establish  the  following 
fact.  Let  m  be  such  that  m=n  if  T=  1 and  m=  lM21 otherwise.  We  will  show  that 
z’z(l/m)6e,.  Since  z’  E WPO(S),  there  exists  PERT  such  that  for  all  ZES, 
PZ~PZ’.  Since  yip  S,  py’spz’  for  all  i.  Furthermore,  if  ieN’,  z,’ + (elf) ES  for 
some  [ > 0,  and  consequently  pi = 0,  hence  py’=  0.  Therefore, 
Since  jM21 5  m,  p  C y’s  mpz’.  Equivalently,  (l/m)p  C y’jpz’.  Since  C y’=Je,,,, 
p((l/m)de,,,)  spz’.  Using  the  fact  that  both  (l/m)6eN  and  z’  are  points  with  equal 
coordinates,  we  obtain  (l/m)ae,s  z’. 
Now  we  go  back  to  the  case  when  t >  1.  Note  that  if  T>  1,  then  m 5  IM’I  for  all 
t=2,...,  T.  Since  (l/m)6e,~z’~z’, 
for  all  t=2,...,  T.  Therefore,  y’~H(p’,p’z’)  for  all  i and  for  all  t = 2, . . . , T. 
Also,  e,y’=6=e,((l/n)z  y’)se,z’.  Therefore,  yieH(eN,  Czf)  for  all  i and  t. 
Altogether,  we  obtain  the  desired  conclusion. 
Claim  3.  SJ;!T’  = S$!,  and  Sj;!T’  = S,$Li for  all  i = 1, . . . , n and  for  all  t = 1, . . . , T-  1. 
Proof.  It  is  clear  that  Sd;!f  ’ 2 Sj;li  for  all  i = 1, . . . , n and  for  all  t = 1, . . . , T-  1. For 
the  other  inclusion  relation,  let  iEN  and  WE Sd,!f’  be  given.  Then  there  exists 
XES’,‘+’  such  that  x-;=w.  If  eNxseNz’,  then  we  are  done.  Otherwise,  let  y  be 
such  that  y=x-(CXj-  CzJ)e{;).  By  the  comprehensiveness  of  S”‘+‘,  _Y~S’~‘+‘. 
Since  eN y=  C zj = eNz’  and  ypj  1X-i  =  w,  w E S2Ai.  Similarly,  we  can  show  that 
Sj;!f’  = Sj,‘!,  for  all  i=  1, . . . , n  and  for  all  t = 1, . . . , T-  1. 
Claim  4.  F(SG ‘, d)  = z’  for  all  r. 
Proof.  Note  that  S ‘9’  = H(e,,  C q’) fl (aeN-  R,“).  Therefore,  by  PO  and  AN, 
F(S  ‘,  ’  ,d)=z’.  By  IAIP  and  Claim  2,  F(S2*‘,d)=F(S3”,d)=F(S4”,d)=z1,  as 
desired. 
Claim  5.  F(S  r,f,  d) = z’  for  all  r and  t. 
Proof.  We  use  induction  on  t,  based  on  Claim  4.  Suppose,  as  an  induction 
hypothesis,  that  the  conclusion  of  Claim  5 holds  for  all  t = 1, . . . , h -  1.  Now  we  con- 
sider  the  case  when  t = h.  We  will  use  Claims  2 and  3 several  times,  without  explicit 
mentioning.  By  WMON  applied  between  (S2’hp1,  d)  and  (S’9h, d),  F(Slxh, d)? 
F(S2~h-1,&=zh~1.  Therefore,  by  PO  and  AN,  F(Slsh, d) =zh.  By  IAIP  applied 
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tween  (S3,h-‘,d)  and  (S3,h,d),  F(S3,h,d)~F(S3,h~‘,d)=zh-1.  Note  that  zeS32h 
and  zzz  hm1  implies  that  z~=z,!-~  for  all  iEMh.  Then  ptz=ptzh=pfzf  for  all 
I=1  , . . . . h  and,  consequently,  ZE S4sh.  Since  F(S3,h,d)zzh-‘,  F(S33h,d)  E S43h. 
Therefore,  by  IAIP  applied  between  (S 3,h, d)  and  (S 4,h, d),  F(S  3*h,  d)  = F(S  4vh,  d)  = 
zh.  Finally,  by  IAIP  applied  between  (S15h, d)  and  (S2Yh,  d),  F(S22h,  d)  =.zh  (this 
final  step  is  not  applicable  when  h = T).  This  completes  the  proof  for  Claim  5. 
Claim  6.  F(S,  d)  = L *(S, d)  c  zT. 
Proof.  From  a  proof  similar  to  that  of  Claim  3,  we  can  show  that  Sj;Ti=S,_;  for 
all  i.  Therefore,  by  applying  WMON  between  (S3’ ‘, d)  and  (S, d),  F(S,  d)z 
F(S  3,  ‘, d)  = zT,  where  the  equality  follows  from  Claim  5.  Since  zr~  PO(S), 
F(S,d)=z’,  as  desired.  Q.E.D. 
4.  Concluding  remarks 
We  have  introduced  and  characterized  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution  for 
n-person  bargaining  problems,  using  five  axioms.  Unfortunately,  L *(S, d)  does  not 
satisfy  individual  rationality  for  more  than  two-person  problems.  One  possible 
modification  L*  of  L*,  which  satisfies  individual  rationality,  can  be  defined  in  the 
following  way.  Given  (S, d)  E 2,  let  S  be  the  comprehensive  hull  of  the  individually 
rational  points  of  (S,d),  i.e.  the  smallest  comprehensive  set  containing 
{xESlx&-d}.Th  en,  take  L*(S,  d)  = L *(S, d).  It  is not  hard  to  verify  that  L*  satisfies 
both  Pareto  optimality  and  individual  rationality  for  all  bargaining  problems.’ 
However,  its  axiomatic  characterization  remains  an  open  question. 
Another  drawback  of  the  solution  L * may  be  that  it  is not  independent  of  the  von 
Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  representations  chosen  (if  any);  in  other  words,  the 
solution  involves  an  implicit  utility  comparison  between  the  agents.’ 
In  this  paper  we  mentioned  three  other  solutions,  which  are  also  not  independent 
of  utility  representations,  namely  the  egalitarian,  the  lexicographic  egalitarian,  and 
the  equal-loss  solutions.  Table  1 summarizes  the  axiomatic  properties  of  these  solu- 
tions  together  with  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution,  and  indicates  where  their 
characterization  results  can  be  found. 
In  our  axioms,  as  well  as  in  the  definition  of  the  lexicographic  equal-loss  solution, 
the  disagreement  point  plays  only  a  modest  role.  Hence  it  is  not  difficult-as  was 
pointed  out  to  us  by  a referee-to  adapt  the  model  for  n-person  social  choice  prob- 
lems  with  cardinal  utility,  i.e.  to  the  present  model  without  a  disagreement  point. 
’  We  are  grateful  to  Walter  Bossert  for  pointing  out  our  earlier  mistake  and  suggesting  this  solution, 
s  In  fact,  Roth  (1977,  1979,  p.  108)  showed  that  a  solution  satisfying  PO,  AN  and  IAIP  should  in- 
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Table  1 
Axiomatic  properties  of  four  bargaining  solutions  (which  are  not  independent  of  utility  representations). 
Weak  Pareto  opfimality  requires  that  the  solution  outcome  be  in  the  set  of  weakly  Pareto  optimal  points 
of  a  feasible  set.  Continuity  requires  that  a  small  change  in  the  feasible  set  results  in  a  small  change  in 
the  solution  outcome.  The  other  axioms  are  discussed  in  the  paper 
Egalitarian  Lexicographic 
egalitarian 
Equal-loss  Lexicographic 
equal-loss 
Weak  Pareto  optimality 
Pareto  optimality 
Continuity 
Anonymity 
Translation  invariance 
Weak  monotonicity 
Independence  of  alternatives 
other  than  the  ideal  point 
Independence  of  irrelevant 
alternatives 



























yes  yes 
no  no 
Kalai  (1977)  Chun  and  Peters 
(1988)  (see  also 
Imai,  1983) 
Chun  (1988)  Current  paper 
Instead  of  the  ideal  point  a(S,d)  one  could  take  the  global  ideal  point  defined  by 
a,(S)  = sup{x;  1  x E S}.  (Of  course,  a;(S)  is assumed  to  be  finite.)  Further  details  are 
omitted. 
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